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ABSTRACT
Background
Providing reassurance is one of physicians’ most frequently used verbal interventions.
However, medical reassurance can fail or even have negative effects. This is frequently the case
in patients with medically unexplained symptoms. It is hypothesized that these patients are
more likely than patients from other groups to incorrectly recall the likelihoods of medical
explanations provided by doctors.
Methods and Findings
Thirty-three patients with medically unexplained symptoms, 22 patients with major
depression, and 30 healthy controls listened to an audiotaped medical report, as well as to
two control reports. After listening to the reports, participants were asked to rate what the
doctor thinks the likelihood is that the complaints are caused by a specific medical condition.
Although the doctor rejected most of the medical explanations for the symptoms in his
verbal report, the patients with medically unexplained complaints remembered a higher
likelihood for medical explanations for their symptoms. No differences were found between
patients in the other groups, and for the control conditions. When asked to imagine that the
reports were applicable to themselves, patients with multiple medical complaints reported
more concerns about their health state than individuals in the other groups.
Conclusions
Physicians should be aware that patients with medically unexplained symptoms recall the
likelihood of medical causes for their complaints incorrectly. Therefore, physicians should verify
correct understanding by using check-back questions and asking for summaries, to improve
the effect of reassurance.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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One major medical intervention by medical practitioners is
the provision of reassurance that symptoms are not caused by
serious medical conditions. However, in a subgroup of
patients, reassurance of normal test results fails, and patients
remain concerned [1]. Reassurance appears to be particularly
ineffective in patients with a history of unclear somatic
complaints [2]. Although the labeling of these syndromes is a
point of discussion (functional syndromes, medically unex-
plained symptoms, somatoform symptoms, psychosomatic
syndromes, etc.), we will use the term ‘‘somatization syn-
drome’’ for patients with medically unexplained symptoms in
this article [3,4]. We will focus on information processing by
these patients when listening and remembering medical
information. Our major question is whether patients with
unclear somatic complaints remember the wrong probabil-
ities about excluded medical causes for their physical
symptoms. Remembering medical reports incorrectly might
not only increase the effects of health anxiety and body
misperception, but may also be a source of misunderstand-
ings between physicians and their patients.
Patients with a history of unclear somatic complaints
represent a substantial subgroup of patients asking for
medical treatment. Van Hemert et al. [5] found that 30% of
newly admitted patients attending general medical out-
patient clinics had no medical diagnosis to account for their
symptoms. While single symptoms may vary, a history of
multiple unclear somatic complaints typically predicts long-
term persistence [6]. These patients with ‘‘somatization
syndrome’’ are responsible for high health-care use and high
treatment costs [7–9]. For the classiﬁcation of somatization
disorder, International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, 10th revision,
includes the criterion that medical reassurance does not have
long-lasting effects. Instead these patients tend to misinter-
pret physical perceptions and doctors’ information [10].
Barsky [11] labels this cognitive style ‘‘somatosensory ampli-
ﬁcation.’’
To date, it is unclear why medical reassurance fails in this
patient group. Somatic stimuli can lead to cognitive
interference in these patients, with the consequence that
medical information is processed and remembered less
efﬁciently [12]. This is not caused by a deﬁciency in the
ability to remember health-related words in general [13].
We hypothesize that patients with somatization syndrome
do not have difﬁculties in remembering the medical terms
provided by their physicians, but in remembering the
likelihood of medical causes for their symptoms. To test
this hypothesis, patients listened to a doctor reporting the
results of a normal physical examination, and afterwards we
assessed patients’ memory of the doctor’s thoughts of the
likelihood of a serious medical condition. To assess the
speciﬁcity of a false probability memory in somatization
disorder, this condition is compared to two other con-
ditions, a social rejection situation and a neutral situation
(car problems). The likelihood ratings for serious interpre-
tations in patients with somatization syndrome are com-
pared to those of patients with major depression (which is a
frequent comorbid disorder, but does not typically share
the somatosensory ampliﬁcation style) and to healthy
controls.
Methods
Participants
The ﬁnal sample consisted of 85 participants: 33 patients
fulﬁlled the criteria for medically unexplained symptoms
(somatization syndrome; see below), 22 patients had major
depression and served as a clinical control group, and 30
participants were inthe healthy controlgroup.The groupsdid
notdiffersigniﬁcantlyintermsofage,sex,ormemorycapacity.
Patient recruitment took place in a hospital for mental and
psychosomatic disorders in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Healthy
controls were recruited from the surroundings of the
University of Marburg; healthy controls did not come from
the surroundings of the hospital; the control group did not
include more health professionals than the other groups.
Patients were included in the somatization group if they
reported having more than seven unclear somatic complaints
during the last 2 y, or if they fulﬁlled the criteria for
hypochondriasis. Somatic complaints were assessed with the
Screening for Somatoform Symptoms (SOMS) and with a
structured clinical interview (see below). Clinical controls had
to fulﬁll the criteria for major depression; they were not
allowed to fulﬁll the criteria for somatization syndrome, even
not according to the less restrictively deﬁned Escobar criteria
SSI-4/6 [14]. Healthy controls could not fulﬁll the criteria for
somatization syndrome SSI-4/6 or any other major mental
disorder.
Assessment
For all patients, the medical records were checked and the
physicians were interviewed to assess whether existing
somatic complaints were medically unfounded. Patients’
psychiatric diagnoses were validated using a structured
clinical interview (IDCL; [15]) to conﬁrm the diagnosis of
somatization syndrome or major depression.
The SOMS [16] was additionally used to assess somatoform
symptoms. This is a self-rating scale asking about 53 somatic
complaints during the last 2 y (e.g., abdominal pain, nausea,
palpitation, pain in extremities, back pain, dizziness, etc.).
Patients were instructed to agree only if the symptom was
present, doctors didn’t ﬁnd a sufﬁcient explanation for the
symptom, and the symptom was disabling or led to doctor
visits. The 53 symptoms cover all the symptoms mentioned in
ICD-10 and DSM-IV for somatization disorder and somato-
form autonomic dysfunction. All positively answered symp-
toms are summed up to a somatization total score, which
corresponds to the number of somatoform symptoms. The
self-rating scale has been shown to be a good indicator for an
interview-based assessment of somatoform symptoms, with
correlations of r ¼ 0.75 between the interview and the self-
rating scale. The retest reliability of the SOMS has been
found to be rtt ¼ 0.85 [16].
The Whiteley Index [17] is a 14-item scale asking for
hypochondriacal symptoms; the answering format is binary
(yes/no). The CES-D is a depression scale that is frequently
used in epidemiological research [18,19]. We used the 15-item
version, with answer categories between zero (rarely) and
three (most of the time).
As the major experimental task depended on memory
capacity, the groups were tested for memory performance
using the digit span, a subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale.
It was hypothesized that patient groups would not differ in
memory capacity.
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The procedure was approved by the ethics committee of
the Chamber of Medicine of the state Rheinland-Pfalz. In the
hospital, patients were prescreened for somatization or
depressive disorder using the SOMS and the depression scale
CES-D. For those patients with increased scores, medical
information was collected to check whether symptoms were
medically unexplained. Patients were then given further
information about the study, and informed consent was
obtained from all participants. A total of 140 patients with
increased depression or somatization scores were informed
about the study, and 98 were willing to participate. Thirteen
patients were excluded because they did not fulﬁll inclusion
criteria for the group they were considered for.
Afterwards, patients ﬁlled in the self-rating scales and
underwent the memory capacity test (digit span). Then the
experimental investigation started.
Experimental Investigation
All participants listened to three audiotapes, which were
presented in a counterbalanced sequence. The tapes pre-
sented oral reports spoken by the same male voice. One
report described a medical situation, one a social situation,
and one a neutral situation. The duration of the three oral
reports was comparable (between 2:16 and 2:28 min). All of
them included concerns (about illness, about social rejection,
or about damage to an expensive car). Each report included
ten principle messages, including four that addressed possible
explanations for the problem: two unequivocal explanations
(e.g., ‘‘The reason for your complaints is deﬁnitely not a
stomach ﬂu’’) and two highly unlikely, but still possible,
explanations (e.g., ‘‘I don’t think that you have bowel cancer;
this is very unlikely’’).
The medical situation was characterized by a person with
abdominal pain visiting his or her doctor, who reports the
results of the medical tests. The social situation was
characterized by a person who learns from a friend that he
or she is not invited to a neighborhood barbecue party. The
neutral situation was characterized by a person having car
problems, and who is informed by the mechanic about
possible reasons why the motor doesn’t work correctly.
After each report, participants were asked ten questions,
including two (after the social situation) to four (after the
medical and neutral situations) items with ratings for the
remembered probabilities ofr e a s o n sf o rt h ep r o b l e m s
presented in the reports. These likelihood items were
answered using a visual analog scale, ranging from zero
(absolutely unlikely) to 100 (absolutely likely). Results of the
likelihood items for each situation type were averaged for the
individuals in each group. The remaining items were about
behavioral aspects or neutral information included in the
reports; they served as items distracting from the main
purpose of the study, and no signiﬁcant differences were
found for the answers to these distracting items.
Table 1 describes some of the information presented orally
by the doctor in the medical report, as well as the correspond-
ingitemsaskedoftheparticipantsafterthepresentationofthe
doctor’s report. The table also includes examples of the other
two types of reports and corresponding items.
We hypothesized that patients with unclear somatic
complaints (somatization syndrome) would remember an
increased likelihood that medical conditions explain the
symptoms, even though the doctor rejected most of the
medical explanations in his report. The clinical and healthy
controls were expected to report very low remembered
probabilities. For the social situation, we expected depressive
patients to be highly sensible and negative interpretations to
be more likely than for the two other groups. For the neutral
condition, we expected comparable ratings for all three
groups.
After asking for the ratings about the likelihoods that the
doctor, the neighbor, and the mechanic assign to different
causes, participants also had to give cognitive and emotional
appraisals, imagining themselves personally in the speciﬁc
situations. The cognitive appraisals were solicited with the
following questions: ‘‘How would you rate your health state
after this discussion with the doctor?’’ (0¼absolutely healthy;
100¼absolutely sick); ‘‘What’s the likelihood you would think
that your neighbors didn’t invite you on purpose?’’ (0–100);
and ‘‘How seriously would you think your car is damaged?’’
(0–100). The emotional appraisals of all three conditions were
solicited with the question: ‘‘How concerned would you be in
this situation?’’ (0–100). It was expected that patients with
somatization syndrome would be most concerned after the
medical encounter, while depressives would be most con-
cerned after the social rejection situation.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed using one-way ANOVA, with subse-
quent Sheffe ´ pairwise comparisons if indicated by a signiﬁ-
cant ANOVA result. Percent data were analyzed using v
2 tests.
Results
General Aspects
The groups were comparable in terms of age, gender, and
memory capacity. Therefore, any group differences for the
probability ratings were not due to general memory differ-
ences. The rates for comorbid anxiety disorders were
comparable between the clinical groups. As expected, the
number of somatoform symptoms was signiﬁcantly the
highest in the somatization group, as were the scores for
hypochondriasis. Patients in the somatization group were also
substantially depressed, which underlines the high comor-
bidity between somatization and depression. Both clinical
groups also showed signiﬁcantly increased scores for health-
care use (see Table 2).
Likelihood Ratings
Thegroupsdifferedsigniﬁcantlyintheirlikelihoodestimates
of medical causes for the abdominal complaints, while they
didn’t differ in their likelihood estimates of social rejection
causesinthesocialsituationorfortheneutralsituationratings.
While controls remembered the doctor’s probability ratings as
very low, patients with unclear somatic complaints remem-
bered the doctor’s likelihood estimates of medical reasons for
thecomplaintstobesigniﬁcantlyhigher.Whileweexpectedthe
depression group to show the highest scores for the social
rejection interpretation of the social situation, these differ-
ences were statistically not signiﬁcant, although the highest
scores were found for the depression group.
We also wanted to examine whether the differences in the
remembered probabilities for medical reasons were due to
the doctor’s statements with ambiguous versus unambiguous
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explanations, while items 2 and 3 express unlikely, but still
possible, options. The scores in Table 3 conﬁrm that healthy
controls rated the probability of medical causes for medically
unambiguous information as lower than the probability of
medically ambiguous information (t ¼ 2.0; d.f. 29; p ¼ 0.05).
This was nearly reversed for the clinical groups. For medically
unambiguous information, signiﬁcant differences between
the groups were found, again with highest scores for the
somatization group. Patients in the somatization group
reported even higher probabilities for explanations unam-
biguously rejected by the doctor than for ambiguous
explanations (t ¼ 2.3, d.f. 32; p , 0.05); for the depression
group, this comparison was not signiﬁcant (t¼1.8; d.f. 21; not
signiﬁcant).
Cognitive Appraisal
The cognitive appraisal task asked for the likelihood
estimations of negative interpretations if participants were
Table 1. Examples of Information in Oral Reports and Corresponding Items
Condition Report’s Content Corresponding Item
Medical report Doctor: The medical investigation has shown that
the reason for your complaints is certainly not a
stomach flu, although this was our first idea.
What does your doctor think the likelihood is that your complaints are due to a
stomach flu (Answerrange: 0–100)?
We also didn’t find any blood in your stool. Blood
in the stool can indicate a possible bowel cancer.
However, with this finding we don’t believe that
you have bowel cancer; this is very unlikely.
What does your doctor think the likelihood is you are suffering from gut cancer?
Moreover, I palpated your abdomen yesterday and
we made ultrasound investigations. Again, this didn’t
reveal any significant findings. Therefore, it is unlikely
that you have any serious medical condition.
What does your doctor think the likelihood is that you have a serious medical
condition?
You also don’t have a stomach ulcer; I definitely would
have seen it in the ultrasound examination.
What does your doctor think the likelihood is you have stomach ulcer?
Social situation Friend: I don’t think that your neighbor didn’t want
you to join the barbecue party, and that he didn’t
invite you on purpose. You shouldn’t take it personally.
What does your friend think the likelihood is that the neighbor didn’t want you
to join the barbecue party?
I know that your neighbors were surprised when you didn’t
say hello the last time you saw them, but I told them that
you just didn’t see them. That’s what they thought already,
and they weren’t upset. Therefore I’m sure this wasn’t a
reason not to invite you to the party.
What does your friend think the likelihood is that you were not invited because
you didn’t say to the neighbors?
Neutral situation Well, your car is quite old, but I think it’s unlikely that
the motor is seriously ruined. If that had happened,
you would have noticed it earlier. Therefore, let’s suppose
that it’s not the most serious case.
What does your mechanic think the likelihood is your motor is ruined seriously?
Another reason could be damaged fuel lines. In your case,
however, we can exclude this possibility, as your tank is
still full, and we didn’t see any fuel puddles.
What does your mechanic think the likelihood is that the fuel lines are damaged?
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030269.t001
Table 2. Sample Characteristics
Variable Somatization Group
(Group A)
Depression Group
(Group B)
Control Group
(Group C)
Statistics
a
N 33 22 30
Age 43.76 (10.21) 40.86 (10.29) 44.57 (12.80) F(2,82) ¼ 0.74, ns
Gender 26 female, 7 male 13 female, 9 male 23 female, 7 male v
2 ¼ 2.92, ns
Higher education 20 (60.6%) 20 (90.9%) 25 (83.3%) v
2 ¼ 8.0; p , 0.02
Memory capacity (digit span) 10.3 (2.1) 11.5 (2.8) 11.2 (2.4) F(2,82) ¼ 1.8; ns
Comorbid anxiety disorders 7 (21.2%) 4 (18.2%) 0 v
2 ¼ 1.0; ns (only groups A and B compared)
(Comorbid) depressive disorder 8 (24.2%) 22 (100%) 0 v
2 ¼ 13.3; p , 0.01 (only groups A and B compared)
Somatization symptoms (SOMS-2) 11.64 (4.90) 4.00 (2.58) 0.60 (0.93) F(2,82) ¼ 88.19, p , 0.001; AB, AC, BC
Hypochondriasis (Whiteley Index) 7.48 (3.26) 3.95 (2.95) 1.47 (3.69) F(2,82) ¼ 41.55; p , 0.001; AB, AC, BC
Depression (CES-D) 64.79 (11,79) 69.91 (8,85) 43.33 (6,21) F(2,82) ¼ 62.98; p , 0.001; AC, BC
Doctor visits (last 12 mo) 32.52 (25.72) 31.09 (35.22) 7.23 (6.33) F(2,82) ¼ 10.07; p , 0.01; AC, BC
Values (except for sample size and gender) are given as mean (standard deviation).
aSignificant pairwise group differences are indicated by the two corresponding letters (e.g., BC indicates significant group difference between depression and control group).
ns, not significant.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030269.t002
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were no signiﬁcant group differences for any of the situations
(see Table 3).
Emotional Appraisal
The questions about emotional appraisal asked how
concerned participants would be if they were in the
situations. A highly signiﬁcant effect was found for the
medical situation: patients with unclear somatic complaints
would ﬁnd it highly concerning to suffer from abdominal
pain and to get the doctor’s report. However, there was also a
weaker, but still signiﬁcant, effect for emotional appraisal of
the neutral situation: patients with somatization syndrome
were also more concerned about the negative outcome of the
car investigation (see Table 3).
Further Analysis
We wanted to analyze how the overestimation of medical
probabilities was related to other psychological variables.
Therefore, we correlated the likelihood estimates for the
medical explanations with health anxiety (Whiteley Index),
depression (CES-D), and number of somatoform symptoms
(SOMS). Overestimation of medical probabilities was asso-
ciated with higher health anxiety (r¼0.26; p , 0.05) and with
more somatoform symptoms (r¼0.26; p , 0.05), but not with
depression (r ¼ 0.12; not signiﬁcant). This again conﬁrms the
speciﬁcity of the found effect.
Discussion
Our results show that patients with unclear medical
symptoms overestimate the likelihood of medical causes of
symptoms. Although in the medical report the doctor
rejected most of the mentioned medical explanations for
the symptoms, the patients with unclear somatic complaints
remembered higher probabilities for these medical explan-
ations. The mean estimates of the somatization patients for
the likelihood of medical explanations were about 15%,
which is not very high, but still suggests that the patients had
not discarded the medical causes as a possibility. Patients with
medically unexplained symptoms might have a tendency to
overestimate the risk of diseases in general, as was found for
hypochondriasis [20,21]. This tendency might be maintained
by further remembering increased likelihood estimates for
medical causes. As our clinical group included only four (of
33) patients with hypochondriasis, the reported effects are
not completely determined by this small subgroup, but also
hold for somatization syndrome in general.
Our results are all the more striking because our items
about the likelihood of explanations were not related to the
patient’s personal situation, but to a virtual situation. This
bias in remembering likelihood estimates was only found for
the medical report situation, not for the social or neutral
situations. Amazingly, this effect was even more pronounced
for the unequivocally rejected medical explanations, com-
pared to the unlikely, but marginally probable, explanations.
This effect cannot be accounted for by a general memory
deﬁcit, because the groups performed equally well on the digit
span test. Also a general deﬁcit in the ability to remember
illness-related information cannot explain the results. In a
previous study [13], we compared 58 patients with somatiza-
tion syndrome and 21 healthy controls. In a free recall
memory test, participants had to report memorized words
from a list including neutral and illness-related words. No
group differences were found. Some contradictory results to
this exist, but they found only small effects [22,23]. For
somatization-associated problems, attentional biases in favor
of medical information were not found [24]. Therefore, a
general memory bias for illness-related information in
patientswithmedicallyunexplained symptomsseemsunlikely.
Further items assessed cognitive interpretation and emo-
tional involvement if participants were confronted with the
mentioned situation personally. As expected, we found
highest scores for emotional involvement for the somatiza-
tion syndrome group in the medical condition. Although this
group also showed increased emotional appraisal scores for
the neutral situation, group differences were most pro-
nounced for the medical situation. This conﬁrms in part the
reduced capacity of patients with somatization syndrome to
cope with physical misperceptions, and to cope with
unexplained symptoms. It has been demonstrated that
Table 3. Probability Ratings
Variable Appraisal Type Somatization Group
(Group A)
Depression Group
(Group B)
Control Group
(Group C)
Statistics
a
Probability medical 15.17 (16.44) 9.73 (8.49) 4.91 (4.53) F(2,82) ¼ 6.33**; AC
Probability social 26.03 (23.70) 30.86 (23.92) 27.75 (26.57) F(2,82) ¼ 0.25, ns
Probability neutral 23.92 (13.43) 21.86 (16.06) 25.10 (13.45) F(2,82) ¼ 0.33, ns
Medically unambiguous information 19.17 (20.27) 13.09 (16.20) 3.62 (4.71) F(2,82) ¼ 8.13 **; AC (BC)
Medically ambiguous information 11.18 (18.09) 6.36 (6.35) 6.20 (6.66) F(2,82) ¼ 1.59, ns
Medical situation Cognitive appraisal 30.55 (23.17) 20.14 (15.29) 21.83 (19.67) F(2,82) ¼ 2.26, ns
Emotional appraisal 44.36 (31.06) 26.36 (24.84) 22.33 (22.70) F(2,82) ¼ 5.96**; (AB) AC
Social situation Cognitive appraisal 49.67 (35.56) 55.00 (30.78) 49.33 (33.39) F(2,82) ¼ 0.22, ns
Emotional appraisal 45.79 (32.28) 51.36 (37.33) 30.37 (29.52) F(2,82) ¼ 3.01
Neutral situation Cognitive appraisal 28.55 (18.08) 25.45 (21.10) 30.23 (19.48) F(2,82) ¼ 0.39, ns
Emotional appraisal 41.39 (30.17) 25.45 (25.72) 26.97 (18.08) F(2,82) ¼ 3.60*; (AC, AB)
Values are given as mean (standard deviation). Range of probability ratings from zero (absolutely unlikely) to 100 (absolutely probable).
aSignificant pairwise group differences are indicated by the two corresponding letters (e.g., BC indicates significant group difference between depression and control group); pairs in
brackets indicate near significance: 0.10 . p . 0.05. Significance tests are two-tailed. *, p , 0.05; **, p , 0.001; ns, not significant.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030269.t003
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more thoughts about illness interpretation of bodily sensa-
tions, and that their thought content resembles catastrophic
interpretations [9,10]. This threatening interpretation and
subsequent attention-focusing increases the perception of
pain symptoms and reduces distraction [25], leading to a
vicious circle of somatosensory ampliﬁcation. This vicious
circle might be further ampliﬁed by the demonstrated
memory bias in overestimating the probabilities of causes
discussed during medical encounters.
The strength of this study seems to be the ecological
validity of the study design using a typical physician
explanation that test results have not revealed any patho-
logical ﬁndings, but also the use of two comparison groups
and two comparison situations. However, this study also
suffers from some shortcomings. The results would be
strengthened if more than one report per situation type
were tested. With the procedure used in this study, the
number of assessment items is limited by the number of
reports and included statements. Therefore, our number of
items per condition is low, and could be increased by using
multiple situation presentati o n s .F u r t h e r m o r e ,w eu s e d
medical explanations with likelihood ratings in the extreme
range (‘‘it’s extremely unlikely that you have ...’’); although
this is a frequent condition in medical practice, the
psychometric properties of these extreme ratings are less
optimal to show group differences. Moreover, deﬁning
somatization syndrome for patients with unclear somatic
complaints is still a point of discussion [26,27]. In this study,
we wanted to be on the safe side and included only patients
with at least seven medically unexplained symptoms during
the last 2 y. This criterion has been shown to be associated
with an optimum of sensitivity and speciﬁcity in differ-
entiating disabled patients [28,29]. As our patients were
selected in a psychosomatic hospital, which is typically the
ultimate step of the treatment path for this syndrome, our
sample represents the highly disabled and chronically ill
subgroup of patients with somatization syndrome. Further,
the groups were comparable on most, but not all, demo-
graphic variables. Fewer patients in the somatization group
reported higher education than patients in the other groups.
However, the memory test (digit span), which is an important
predictor of intellectual capacity, especially for the task used
in this trial, was comparable between groups.
This study has clinical implications for the most frequently
used medical intervention, namely, providing reassurance.
Doctors usually expect that explaining that tests have shown
no abnormality is enough to reduce health anxiety [1], but
Coia and Morley [30] have summarized that medical
reassurance frequently leads to harmful responses and
increases in health anxiety. Our results show that medical
reassurance and the presentation of negative test results can
lead to patients remembering overestimated probabilities for
medical explanations, especially in patients with unclear
somatic complaints. Physicians should keep this effect in
mind and try to reduce it. Check-back questions on what
patients have understood from doctors’ reports, and asking
patients for summaries about the provided information,
could help to detect this memory bias, and offer the
opportunity to correct the remembered likelihood estimates
[31]. These implications should be further addressed in future
studies.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Being told by the doctor that that niggling headache or
persistent stomach ache is not caused by a medical condition reassures
most patients. But for some—those with a history of medically
unexplained complaints—being told that tests have revealed no
underlying cause for their symptoms provides little or no reassurance.
Such patients have what is sometimes called ‘‘somatization syndrome.’’
In somatization, mental factors such as stress manifest themselves as
physical symptoms. Patients with somatization syndrome start to report
multiple medically unexplained symptoms as young adults. These
symptoms, which change over time, include pain at different sites in
the body and digestive, reproductive, and nervous system problems.
What causes this syndrome is unknown and there is no treatment other
than helping patients to control their symptoms.
Why Was This Study Done? Patients with medically unexplained
complaints make up a substantial and expensive part of the workload of
general medical staff. Part of this expense is because patients with
somatization syndrome are not reassured by their medical practitioners
telling them there is no physical cause for their symptoms, which leads
to requests for further tests. It is unclear why medical reassurance fails in
these patients, but if this puzzle could be solved, it might help doctors to
deal better with them. In this study, the researchers tested the idea that
these patients do not accept medical reassurance because they
incorrectly remember what their doctors have told them about the
likelihood that specific medical conditions could explain their symptoms.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers recruited
patients with medically unexplained symptoms and, for comparison,
patients with depression and healthy individuals. All the participants
were assessed for somatization syndrome and their general memory
tested. They then listened to three audiotapes. In one, a doctor gave test
results to a patient with abdominal pain (a medical situation). The other
two tapes dealt with a social situation (the lack of an invitation to a
barbecue) and a neutral situation (a car breakdown). Each tape
contained ten messages, including four that addressed possible
explanations for the problem. Two were unambiguous and negative—
for example, ‘‘the reason for your complaints is definitely not stomach
flu.’’ Two were ambiguous but highly unlikely—‘‘we don’t think that you
have bowel cancer; this is very unlikely.’’ The researchers then assessed
how well the participants remembered the likelihood that any given
explanation was responsible for the patient’s symptoms, the missing
invitation, or the broken-down car. The patients with somatization
syndrome overestimated the likelihood of medical causes for symptoms,
particularly (and somewhat surprisingly) when the doctor’s assessment
had been unambiguous. By contrast, the other participants correctly
remembered the doctor’s estimates as low. The three study groups were
similar in their recall of the likelihood estimates from the social or neutral
situation. Finally, when asked to imagine that the medical situation was
personally applicable, the patients with unexplained symptoms reacted
more emotionally than the other study participants by reporting more
concerns with their health.
What Do These Findings Mean? These results support the researchers’
hypothesis that people with somatization syndrome remember the
chance that a given symptom has a specific medical cause incorrectly.
This is not because of a general memory deficit or an inability to commit
health-related facts to memory. The results also indicate that these
patients react emotionally to medical situations, so they may find it hard
to cope when a doctor fails to explain all their symptoms. Some of these
characteristics could, of course, reflect the patients’ previous experiences
with medical professionals, and the experiment will need to be repeated
with additional taped situations and more patients before firm
recommendations can be made to help people with somatization
syndrome. Nevertheless, given that medical reassurance and the
presentation of negative results led to overestimates of the likelihood
of medical explanations for symptoms in patients with somatization
syndrome, the researchers recommend that doctors bear this bias in
mind. To reduce it, they suggest, doctors could ask patients for
summaries about what they have been told. This would make it possible
to detect when patients have misremembered the likelihood of various
medical explanations, and provide an opportunity to correct the
situation.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/ DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030269.
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